In September 2014, the defendant was living in an apartment in Qomri, Malta. He was living with A and her daughter, B, as well as his partner C. A and B came to Malta from Romania. The defendant had created a website ‘Escort Europe’ where one could find A’s mobile number and photos of A and C in underwear and showing intimate parts of their bodies. Neither A nor C approved of this website, but the defendant resorted to physical violence if they resisted. The defendant’s partner, C, rented another apartment in San Gwann, Malta, but only the defendant had effective control over it. The apartment in San Gwann was used by the defendant so that A could meet up with male clients for sexual encounters against payment. A had three or four encounters of a sexual nature there for a week. She was forced by the defendant who would verbally threaten her, or beat her up, if she did not comply. A was paid 80€ for a half hour of sexual activity and had to pass 40% of her earnings to the defendant. The defendant also forced C into prostitution. C went to a hotel about three times to provide sexual services to clients. She did not want to give sexual services but was forced by the defendant who was physically violent with her if she refused. C was also taken to the apartment in San Gwann for prostitution. C felt like she was not free to leave and was afraid of the defendant.

A darknet website called "Welcome to Video", was operated by the defendant (a national of Republic of Korea) between the 8 July 2015 and 4 March 2018 for the purposes of exchanging child sexual abuse material. Website users were able to reach the posted content through Bitcoin payments or by uploading more content which amounted to particular “points”, enabling acess to more content. Each user was able to create a unique Bitcoin adress when registering to the website, in which an analysis of the server revealed that there were over one million Bitcoin adresses, meaning that the website had capacity for at least one million users. US law enforcement was able to trace down the Bitcoin transfers to locate the perpetrators adress, located in the Republic of Korea. As a result of a joint operation between the US, UK and Korean law enforcement, the website operator was arrested, seizing approximately 8 terabytes of child sexual exploitation material. The involved law enforcement agencies shared the data from the seized server with law enforcement around the world, resulting in the arrest of 337 individuals in 12 different countries. According to the analysis conducted, approximately 45% of seized videos analyzed were child sexual exploitation material that had not previously identified.

From March to July 2021, a total of 500 workers came to Serbia according to the information received from Labour Inspectorate (the information was sent in May 2022, almost a year later). The workers were recruited to work for China Energy Engineering Group Tianjin Electric Power Construction (TEPC), through several Vietnamese agencies (Sông Hỷ Gia Lai Company, Bảo Sơn Company (note: “Công ty” means Company), Kaizen Joint Stock Company, CEC Career and Education Consultancy Company, Lạc International Cooperation and Investment Joint Stock Company, Hồ Thanh International Manpower Supply and Service Joint Stock Company, Sum Việt Nam). The majority of these workers learned about the job offer through acquaintances, while some workers found the offer online. However, the job advertisement referred to the production of aircraft parts in Serbia, not tires. The workers were told that the company was Chinese, but that the management was German. The workers were promised a salary in the amount of EUR 775, decent work and accommodation conditions, all of which, when compared to the average salary in Vietnam, was substantially better. The transport of the workers was organized by agencies from Vietnam, who had charged the workers 2,200 to 4,000 US dollars in advance for their services (transportation, obtaining visas and accommodation). Workers mostly borrowed money from their family members, loan sharks, agencies, and they were conditioned to stay in employment for a year, otherwise their debts would increase significantly (debt bondage). For this reason, most workers were reluctant to return home, despite the poor conditions in the factory. At the time, the Vietnamese agencies were allowed to charge clients for the service. The workers were hired under a contract with China Energy Engineering Group Tianjin Electric Power Construction Co. LTD, branch in Belgrade. The Chinese company Linglong International Europe ltd. Zrenjanin had hired the contractor China Energy Engineering Group Tianjin Electric Power Construction at its car tire factory construction site in Zrenjanin, and the said company has been recruiting workers to work in Serbia through a dozen agencies from Vietnam. The Vietnamese workers were employees of the Chinese company China Energy Engineering Group Tianjin Electric Power Construction Co. Ltd. and sent by written order to work in a local branch in Belgrade (therefore, this is a movement of workers within a foreign company). None of the workers who signed the contract was given a start date, and based on their statements, the salaries were paid to them in cash. The workers had to sign at least five (5) types of contracts – all five containing articles that are not in accordance to the international standards, and also Serbian legal framework. From the contracts analysed, it can be confirmed that the workers were instructed that they are coming to work to the country (Serbia) with strong Sharīʿah laws. It can also be noted that some of the workers signed their contracts with the fingerprint (in red), instead of the signature, which can mean that some of the workers were illiterate. This would make the workers even more susceptible to the deception. The work took place in shifts lasting 9 hours each, with a single lunch break lasting one hour. The employer did not provide the use of all the means and equipment necessary for the personal protection at work, and deducted the costs of a part of the work equipment (boots, gloves, work suit) from the salary. Every 10 days, workers received work gloves, and if they had been damaged earlier, the workers had to cover the costs of obtaining new ones themselves. Workers were obliged to work 26 days per month, and if for any reason they did not fulfil this, and they had even a day less, they were not paid for the entire month. Also, in case they did not come to work on time, they were fined by being denied the daily wage. Upon their arrival to Serbia, the workers had to hand over their passports to the employer, as they were told that this was the practice when for foreign citizens. In December 2021 they received their documents back (case getting into public). Although some of the workers were convinced that they had a residence permit and a work permit, no one could confirm this information with certainty, nor did they receive a printed copy of any of the permits. Freedom of movement for the workers is very limited. They can only move to their workplace and back to the accommodation facilities, always under the supervision of the management and private security. When they arrived to Serbia, the workers were housed in barracks that did not have adequate conditions for living or short term stays. There were bunk beds in the overcrowded rooms, and only two toilets in the building for the stated number of workers (500). The beds did not have mattresses, but rather thin quilts covering some wooden planks. At the initial accommodation site, there were no adequate infrastructure or sewerage, with faeces being spilled out about ten meters from the barracks, thus making the conditions extremely unsafe for the health of the workers. In addition, the workers were not provided with heating, electricity, or drinking water, there were no hot water for showering and clothes were hand washed in cold water and dried on the ropes where they hung their other clothes also, as they had no closets. The workers testified that approximately half of them wanted to return home to Vietnam, but they could not because they were not in possession of their passports, and had not been paid all the agreed salaries. They claimed they had to wait for the employer to purchase their tickets. Some of the workers were particularly afraid of deportation, because, in that case, they would have not been able to settle the debts they had made in order to start working in Serbia.

In the case of the minor female victim, a Nigerian woman residing in Italy, a family friend of the minor herself, proposed to the minor that she emigrate to Italy to engage in prostitution. The trafficking victim accepts the proposal, naively believing that prostitution meant having a relationship with a man, who in exchange for the relationship would repay the €30,000 debt incurred in order to arrive in Italy. The victim makes an agreement with her boyfriend, also a Nigerian, and they both leave for Italy, where they enter illegally via Libya, crossing the Sicilian channel and landing in Lampedusa; both are then transferred to a first reception center for applicants for international protection in Sardinia. After a few weeks in the first reception center, the same woman who had convinced the minor to come to Italy, contacts the latter and by going in person manages to get her into her care by taking her to her own home, in which she lives together with two children and her Italian partner in Veneto, where the minor is forced into street prostitution. The investigation initially stemmed from a report initiated by an operator of the first reception center in Sardinia, who was suspicious of the manner in which the woman who had obtained custody of the minor had presented herself. The payment of the debt incurred by the victim was returned in cash collected from the exercise of prostitution, the proceeds of which were entirely handed over to the woman who exploited her, who also retained a share for the payment of rent and maintenance. The exploiter did not engage in prostitution, although she too had engaged in this activity in the past. In the second case, a Nigerian woman who was a saleswoman in a store in Nigeria was offered by another woman, also Nigerian, to come to Italy with the prospect of finding a job with which she could earn much more money and thus support her family. After accepting and contracting the debt, still in Nigeria, the woman would be escorted before a priest who would make the women swear that they would fulfill the debt. They would then embark on their journey to Italy, taking them to Libya, where a Nigerian man would take the trafficking victim's mobile phone and give her another from which she would be contacted after she landed in Italy. Once she arrived in Italy illegally, the victim would phone the woman who had offered her the trip, warning her of her arrival and that she would be in a first reception center in northern Italy; then, within a short period of time, she would be contacted by a third woman who instructed her to take a bus and arrive at a nearby location in the Veneto region where she would be housed in an apartment. In this transportation and hospitality activity the exploitative woman was supported by two other men one from the Ivory Coast and one from Gambia. Upon arriving at the apartment, the victim was immediately escorted to the street to engage in prostitution, but she initially refused. Faced with her refusal, the trafficking victim was locked up in another apartment, where, tied to a chair, she was repeatedly beaten until she agreed to prostitution. The Nigerian woman who housed and exploited her, had all the proceeds of the prostitution activity handed over to her in cash, part of which was paid to the first Nigerian woman, who lived in another city in northern Italy for payment of the debt incurred in Nigeria by the victim and other part she kept for her hospitality in the apartment and for maintenance. Both Nigerian women perpetrators of trafficking and sexual exploitation were married or otherwise cohabiting with Italian men and were mothers; both Italian men were aware of the activities of their female companions and enjoyed the associated financial benefits. The woman who harbored the woman and in fact was materially the one who supervised her and forced her into prostitution was the same woman who had been the perpetrator of the same crimes against the underage woman.

Omuro was the operator of the website myredbook.com. According to information available on that website as of the date of its seizure by the FBI, myredbook.com purported to provide “Escort, Massage, and Strip Club Reviews”. Although the website could be accessed for free, myredbook.com charged fees for premier placement of prostitution advertisers and for “VIP Membership,” which purportedly allowed customers access to “private forums” and to search reviews of the prostitution services. According to an affidavit submitted in connection with the sentencing hearing, the FBI identified more than 50 juveniles who were also advertisers on myredbook.com for the purpose of prostitution. Co-defendant Annmarie Lanoce pleaded guilty to assisting Omuro with the operation of the myredbook site pursuant to a diversion program that ran into 2016. At sentencing, Omuro was ordered to forfeit more than USD 1.28 million in proceeds from his operation of the site.

On April 9, 2018 the US Department of Justice seized Backpage.com, the Internet’s leading forum for prostitution ads and a place were sex traffickers frequently advertisers children and adults. Backpage earned hundreds of millions of dollars from facilitating prostitution and sex trafficking and served as a platform for human traffickers. In addition, seven Backpage executives were indicted for their role in a conspiracy to facilitate prostitution and were charged with 40 counts of money laundering in various forms. On April 12, 2018, the Justice Department announced that Backpage’s cofounder and CEO, Carl Ferrer, 57, of Frisco, Texas, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to facilitate prostitution using a facility in interstate or foreign commerce and to engage in money laundering. Additionally, several Backpage-related corporate entities, including Backpage.com LLC, have entered guilty pleas to conspiracy to engage in money laundering. In his plea agreement, Ferrer admitted that he conspired with other Backpage principals to engage in various money laundering offenses. Specifically, Ferrer admitted that since 2004, Backpage has earned hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue from publishing “escort” and “adult” ads. Over time, many banks, credit card companies, and other financial institutions refused to do business with Backpage due to the illegal nature of its business. In response, Ferrer admitted that he worked with his co-conspirators to find ways to fool credit card companies into believing that Backpage-associated charges were being incurred on different websites, to route Backpage-related payments and proceeds through bank account held in the name of seemingly unconnected entities, and to use cryptocurrency processing companies for similar purposes. Backpage advertisers used the proceeds of crime (money earned from pimping/prostitution) to purchase ads on Backpage; additionally, the fees which Backpage collected for posting prostitutions ads also constituted the proceeds of unlawful activity.